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Whether crime victims have rights before formal criminal charges are
filed has recently come to the fore in one of the most publicized criminal cases
in recent memory. For more than twelve years, victims of Jeffrey Epstein’s
sex trafficking organization have attempted to invalidate a non-prosecution
agreement (NPA) entered between Epstein and federal prosecutors. The
victims have argued that because prosecutors deliberately concealed the
NPA from them, the prosecutors violated the federal Crime Victim’s Rights
Act (CVRA). On April 14, 2020, a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit
entered a surprising ruling, rejecting the victims’ argument. The panel
refused to find a CVRA violation, reasoning that because the Government
never filed federal charges, the CVRA was never triggered.
On August 7, 2020, the full Eleventh Circuit vacated the earlier panel
decision and agreed to rehear the case en banc. This article critiques the
earlier panel decision and explains why the Eleventh Circuit en banc should
proceed in the opposite direction. Under the now-vacated panel decision,
“secret” justice was permitted, depriving crime victims in the Eleventh
Circuit of any CVRA rights until the Government formally files charges. This
would have created perverse incentives for the Government to negotiate
secret agreements within the Eleventh Circuit rather than elsewhere, such as
in the adjoining Fifth Circuit. This article concludes that the Eleventh Circuit
en banc should recognize that the CVRA extends rights to crime victims even
before charges are filed. The article also urges Congress to clarify and
amend the CVRA to ensure that secret NPAs are not permitted in future
federal criminal cases and, more broadly, to protect crime victims during
federal criminal investigations.
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CIRCUMVENTING THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
UPHOLDING JEFFREY EPSTEIN’S SECRET NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENT
Paul G. Cassell,* Jordan Peck,** and Bradley J. Edwards***
As crime victims’ rights enactments spread around the country, 1 an
important question is whether they apply before prosecutors file criminal
charges. Many rights in those enactments can apply only after the filing of
criminal charges, such as the victim’s right to be heard during court
proceedings. But other rights clearly could extend pre-charging. For example,
a crime victim could be given a right to confer with prosecutors while
prosecutors are considering what charges to file. Or a victim’s right to be
treated with fairness could apply during investigations.
Whether victims have rights pre-charging is a vital issue for making
crime victims’ protections effectives. In many cases, prosecutors may enter
into plea negotiations well before drafting any charges. In some cases,
prosecutors may even enter non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) with
defendants, agreeing never to lodge any charges. If crime victims’ protections
do not come into play until the formal filing of charges, then crime victims
can be effectively excluded from any role regarding whether charges are filed
or, if so, what those charges might be.
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have represented numerous Jeffrey Epstein sex abuse victims in various cases, including the
Eleventh Circuit case that is the centerpiece of this article.
1
See Paul G. Cassell, The Maturing Victims’ Rights Movement, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 1 (2015). See generally DOUGLAS EVAN BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, MEG GARVIN &
STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2018).
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This issue has recently come to the fore in one of the nation’s most
publicized criminal cases in recent memory. For more than twelve years,
victims of Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking organization have attempted to
invalidate an NPA entered between federal prosecutors and Epstein.2 The
victims have argued that because the prosecutors deliberately concealed the
NPA, the prosecutors violated their right to confer under the federal Crime
Victim’s Rights Act (CVRA).3 In 2011, the federal district court presiding
over the case agreed with the victims, concluding that the CVRA protected
Epstein’s victims even though the prosecutors had never formally filed
federal criminal charges in that case.
Following years of litigation, however, the case went up on appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit. On April 14, 2020, a divided panel entered a surprising
ruling.4 The panel recognized that victims (such as lead petitioner Courtney
Wild) and more than thirty other girls “suffered unspeakable horror” at the
hands of Epstein’s international sex trafficking organization. 5 And the panel
agreed that the prosecutors’ concealment of the deal was “beyond
scandalous” and produced “a tale of national disgrace.”6 Indeed, the panel
explained that after the victims reported Epstein’s sex abuse, they were “left
in the dark—and, so it seems, affirmatively misled—by government lawyers”
about a secret non-prosecution agreement that the prosecutors negotiated
with Epstein.7
Yet on these egregious facts, a divided panel (in three separate opinions
spanning 120 pages) refused to find any violation of the CVRA. The panel
reasoned that because the prosecutors—working closely with Epstein’s
battery of high-powered lawyers—maneuvered to avoid lodging federal
criminal charges, the CVRA was never “trigger[ed].”8 The panel admitted
that under its narrow reading, “[T]he CVRA will not prevent federal
prosecutors from negotiating ‘secret’ plea and non-prosecution agreements,
without ever notifying or conferring with victims, provided that they do so

2

See generally BRADLEY J. EDWARDS, RELENTLESS PURSUIT: MY FIGHT FOR THE
VICTIMS OF JEFFREY EPSTEIN (2020).
3
Pub. L. 108-405, Title I, § 101, Oct. 30, 2004, 118 Stat. 2261, codified in 18 U.S.C. §
3771 (2006).
4
In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 2020), rehearing en banc granted, opinion
vacated by In re Wild, 2020 WL 4557083.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. (emphasis added).
8
Id.
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before instituting criminal proceedings.”9 Judge Hull’s sixty-page dissent put
the matter more plainly: “[T]he [m]ajority’s contorted statutory interpretation
materially revises the statute’s plain text and guts victims’ rights under the
CVRA.”10
On August 7, 2020, the full Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel decision
and ordered rehearing en banc. This Article critiques the earlier panel
decision and explains why the Eleventh Circuit en banc should proceed in the
opposite direction and recognize that the CVRA extends some rights to crime
victims before charges are filed. Under the panel’s ruling, “secret” justice
would have been permitted, circumventing the CVRA and depriving crime
victims in the Eleventh Circuit of any CVRA rights until the Government
formally files charges. The decision should be overturned by the full Court
acting en banc, and Congress should also step in and amend the CVRA to
protect victims in the Eleventh Circuit and elsewhere.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the procedural
background from the Epstein case, which lead to the issue of the CVRA’s
pre-charging application being addressed by the Eleventh Circuit.
Part II then closely reviews the CVRA’s text and structure. This review
establishes that, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit panel’s holding, the CVRA
extends some rights to crime victims before prosecutors file criminal charges.
In particular, the CVRA’s scope and venue provisions provide clear textual
commands from Congress that victims can exercise certain CVRA rights
while prosecutors are considering whether to institute charges.
Part III then dissects the panel’s conclusion that applying the CVRA
before charges are instituted would have no “logical stopping point” 11 and
would thus interfere with federal criminal investigations. Contrary to the
panel’s position, the CVRA can easily be interpreted as extending rights to
victims when the case has crystalized to the point that specific crimes and
victims are identified. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has long taken such a view 12
without any apparent difficulties.
Given the Eleventh Circuit’s hostility to broadly construing the CVRA
to achieve its purposes, Part IV briefly sketches out what a congressional
9

Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1225 (Hull, J., dissenting).
11
Id. at 1213.
12
In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).
10
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amendment to the CVRA would look like to clarify the Act’s coverage and
ensure that crime victims in the federal criminal justice system have protected
rights before charging. Congress could specifically guarantee that victims
have the right to confer with prosecutors before any NPA is finalized. And,
more broadly, Congress could guarantee that victims have CVRA rights
during criminal investigations, such as the right to be treated fairly.
A brief conclusion to this Article explains how the issues presented in
the Epstein case under the CVRA may be litigated under similar state crime
victims’ rights provisions. The same approach urged in this Article as a
matter of federal law should also be applied to those state provisions to ensure
fair treatment of crime victims throughout our nation’s criminal justice
processes.
I. THE CVRA’S PRE-CHARGING APPLICATION DURING THE JEFFREY EPSTEIN
CASE
A. Epstein Obtains Immunity for Himself and His Co-conspirators for
Federal Sex Trafficking Charges
It appears to be generally agreed that the facts underlying the Jeffrey
Epstein case are, as the Eleventh Circuit’s panel decision put it, “beyond
scandalous—they tell a tale of national disgrace.”13 Between 1999 and 2007,
well-heeled and well-connected financier Jeffrey Epstein and multiple coconspirators sexually abused more than thirty girls—some as young as
fourteen—in Palm Beach, Florida, and other locations in the United States,
England, and elsewhere.14 After Epstein’s employees would deliver the girls
to him, Epstein would either sexually abuse them himself, give them to others
to abuse, or both.15
Following a tip in 2005, the Palm Beach Police Department and FBI
spent two years investigating Epstein’s child sex abuse crimes.16 After
collecting compelling evidence against Epstein, the FBI referred the case for
prosecution to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
Florida.17 While the federal prosecutors were evaluating the case, they
13

955 F.3d at 1198.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Epstein’s actions violated both state and federal laws involving child sex abuse.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 2243, & 1591.
17
955 F.3d at 1198-99.
14
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advised Epstein’s victims, via letter, that “as a victim and/or witness of a
federal offense, you have a number of rights.”18 These letters from the Office
then enumerated the eight CVRA rights then in force, 19 including notably
“[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the
case” and “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy.”20
In May 2007, the federal prosecutors drafted a fifty-three-page
indictment charging Epstein with numerous federal sex offenses. 21 The
prosecutors then began contentious negotiations with Epstein’s team of highpowered lawyers. The prosecutors initially sought an agreement requiring
Epstein to plead to at least one felony sex offense. But after considerable
pressure from Epstein’s lawyers,22 the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to a far
more lenient non-prosecution agreement with Epstein for reasons that have
never been clearly explained. Under the NPA, Epstein agreed to plead guilty
only to two state felonies for soliciting prostitution with a minor.23 In
exchange, the U.S. Attorney’s Office extended immunity to Epstein and all
his co-conspirators on the more serious federal charges.24 After entering the
state guilty pleas, Epstein was sentenced to only eighteen months in state
jail.25 During his jail term, Epstein was afforded “work release” to his
luxurious office for twelve hours per day, six days per week. And, of course,

18

Id. at 1199.
In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA to add two additional rights. See infra note
153 and accompanying text. For general background about the enactment of the CVRA,
see Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. 835,
850-52.
20
955 F.3d at 1199 (quoting letters to victims, which in turn quoted 18 U.S.C. §
3771(a)(5) and (8)).
21
955 F.3d at 1199.
22
The U.S. Attorney responsible for the plea deal later revealed that after negotiations
started, “[w]hat followed was a year-long assault on the prosecution and the prosecutors” by
Epstein. Letter from Alex Acosta to Whom It May Concern, Mar. 20, 2011, reprinted in
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/25/jeffrey-epstein-how-the-billionairepedophile-got-off-easy.html. Acosta, however, (implausibly) claimed that the pressure did
not influence the ultimate disposition of the case. Id.
23
This agreement had the effect of labelling Epstein’s child victims, who could not
lawfully consent to sexual activity with adults, as “prostitutes.”
24
Id. at 1199.
25
See Landon Thomas, Financier Starts Sentence in Prostitution Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/business/01epstein.html?_r=1&ref=jeffrey_e_ep
stein
19
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pursuant to the NPA, Epstein (and his co-conspirators) escaped the filing of
any federal charges.
While the U.S. Attorney’s Office was negotiating and entering into
the NPA with Epstein, it kept Epstein’s victims in the dark about what was
happening. Indeed, the prosecutor’s efforts graduated from passive
nondisclosure to active misrepresentation. 26 For example, even after signing
the non-prosecution agreement, the Office sent letters to the victims telling
them that the case was “still under investigation” and that they should be
“patient.”27
B. The District Court Holds that CVRA Rights Apply Pre-Charge
After finally learning about the NPA, in July 2008 two of the victims
(“Jane Doe Number One”28 and “Jane Doe Number Two”) filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act. The victims argued that the prosecutors had violated
their CVRA right to confer as well as their right to be treated with fairness.29
The victims contended that prosecutors should have conferred with them
about the NPA before it became final.
In response, the U.S. Attorney’s Office argued initially that it was
under no obligation to extend the victims any rights under the CVRA,
because “CVRA rights do not attach in the absence of federal criminal
charges filed by a federal prosecutor.” 30 After briefing and argument, in 2011
the district court rejected the government’s claim in a carefully reasoned
published decision.31 The district court held that the victims’ rights “to confer
with the attorney for the Government in the case” 32 and “to be treated with

26
955 F.3d at 1199; see also Doe 1 v. U.S., 359 F.Supp.3d 1201, 1219 (S.D. Fla.
2019) (“Particularly problematic was the Government’s decision to conceal the existence
of the NPA and mislead the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a
possibility.”).
27
955 F.3d at 1199-1200.
28
Jane Doe 1 has since chosen to reveal that her name is Courtney Wild. See note 181
infra (providing further biographical information about Ms. Wild).
29
See Emergency Petition for Victim’s Enforcement of Crime Victim’s Rights Act,
dkt. entry 1, Doe v. United States, No. 9:08-cv-80736 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2008).
30
Gov’t Resp. in Opposition to Victims’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, Does v. U.S.,
No. 9:08-cv-80736, dkt. entry #62 at 7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2011).
31
Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
32
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
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fairness with respect for [their] dignity and privacy”33 apply before charges
are filed.34
In reaching its conclusion, the district court pointed to two CVRA
provisions. First, the court relied on the CVRA’s “coverage” provision,
which provides that “[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice
and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the
detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts
to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in
[the CVRA].”35 The district court reasoned that this provision “contemplates
pre-charge application of the CVRA” because it requires officers who are
involved in the “detection” and “investigation” of federal crimes to afford
victims their rights.36 Second, the district court pointed to the CVRA’s
“venue” provision,37 which states that a victim can assert its CVRA rights “in
the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted or, if no
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime
occurred.”38 The court determined that the plain reading of “no prosecution
is underway” indicates that the CVRA rights apply pre-charge—i.e., before
any prosecution is “underway.”39
C. The District Court Finds the Government Violated the Victim’s Rights
but Ultimately Dismisses the Case as Moot
Following its ruling that the CVRA applied, the district court allowed
the victims to obtain discovery on the government’s plea negotiations with
Epstein. After many years of hard-fought litigation over how the NPA had
been concocted, in February 2019, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the victims.40 Specifically, the District Court found that
the federal prosecutors violated the victims’ CVRA rights by entering into
the secret NPA with Epstein “without conferring with [the victims] during its
negotiation and signing.”41 The district court then directed the victims and
the government (and Epstein, who had intervened in the case) to brief “the

33

18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).
Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
35
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (c)(1)) (emphasis added).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added).
39
Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
40
Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1222 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
41
Id. at 1218.
34
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issue of what remedy, if any, should be applied in view of the [CVRA]
violation.”42
In May 2019, the victims proposed multiple remedies for the proven
CVRA violations. Of particular relevance to this Article, the victims sought
recission of the immunity provisions in the NPA.43 The victims argued that
they were entitled to rescission of the immunity provisions so that they could
use “the full unfettered exercise of their [CVRA] conferral rights at a time
that [would] enable [them] to exercise those rights meaningfully.” 44 The
victims argued that, when other plea arrangements had been found to violate
the law, they had been stricken by the courts. 45 Only if the NPA’s immunity
provision was voided could the victims exercise their right to confer with
federal prosecutors about having charges filed against Epstein and his coconspirators. The victims also sought a bevy of other remedies, including
a victim-impact hearing and a meeting between the victims and Alexander
Acosta, the former United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida
who had secretly entered into the NPA.46 The victims also sought discovery
of certain grand-jury materials and other materials regarding prosecutors’
decision to enter into the NPA, as well as sanctions, attorneys’ fees, and
restitution.47
While the remedy issue was under consideration by the district court,
in August 2019, Epstein was found dead from apparent suicide in a New York
correctional facility.48 In light of Epstein’s death, in September 2019, the
district court dismissed the victims’ suit, thereby denying the victims any
remedies.49 The court reasoned that the victims’ claims regarding rescission
of the NPA’s immunity provisions had become moot. As to Epstein, he was
no longer subject to prosecution due to his death; and as to Epstein’s co-

42

Id. at 1222.
Jane Doe 1 and 2’s Submission on Proposed Remedies, Does v. U.S., No. 9:08-cv80736, dkt. entry #458 at 12-21 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2011).
44
Id. at 15 (quoting U.S. v. BP Products North America, Inc., 2008 WL 501321 at
*14 (S.D. Tex. 2008)).
45
Submission on Proposed Remedies, supra note 43, at 15 (citing U.S. v. Walker, 98
F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996)).
46
Id. at 22–24.
47
Id. at 24–33.
48
Doe 1 v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1325–26 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
49
Id. at 1326–31.
43
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conspirators, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider any application of the
NPA to them because they had not been joined as parties to the action.50
The district court also denied the victims’ requests for a meeting with
former-U.S. Attorney Acosta because the court found it did not have
jurisdiction over him.51 The court also noted that the government had agreed
to “arrange a meeting with government representatives” for the victims, the
victims already had the opportunity for a hearing in the Southern District of
New York, and the Epstein investigation ended upon his death.52 Finally, for
similar reasons, the court denied the victims’ requests for monetary sanctions,
restitution, and attorneys’ fees.53 The district court ended its opinion with a
note of condolence for the victims. The court explained that
despite the victims “having demonstrated the Government
violated their rights under the CVRA, in the end they are not
receiving much, if any, of the relief they sought. They may
take solace, however, in the fact that this litigation has brought
national attention to the Crime Victims' Rights Act and the
importance of victims in the criminal justice system. It has
also resulted in the United States Department of Justice
acknowledging its shortcomings in dealing with crime
victims, and its promise to better train its prosecutors
regarding the rights of victims under the CVRA in the future.
And rulings which were rendered during the course of this
litigation likely played some role, however small it may have
been, in the initiation of criminal charges against Mr. Epstein
in the Southern District of New York and that office’s
continuing investigation of others who may have been
complicit with him.”54

Id. at 1326–28 (holding that “[s]ince the alleged co-conspirators are not parties to the
case, any ruling this Court makes that purports to affect their rights under the NPA would
merely be advisory and is thus beyond this Court’s jurisdiction to issue.”).
51
After orchestrating the Epstein NPA in 2007 and 2008, Acosta had left the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and then reentered federal government service in 2016 as the Secretary
of Labor. When Epstein was arrested, a firestorm of controversy broke out over his role in
the NPA, leading to his resignation. See Annie Karni et al., Acosta to Resign as Labor
Secretary Over Jeffrey Epstein Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2019, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/us/politics/acosta-resigns-trump.html.
52
See 411 F. Supp. 3d at 1328–29.
53
See id. at 1330–31.
54
Id. at 1331–32.
50
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D. An Eleventh Circuit Panel Reverses the District Court’s Holding that
CVRA Rights Apply Pre-Charge—and the Circuit Agrees to Rehear the
Case En Banc
Following the district court’s mootness ruling and denial of the
victims’ remedial requests, in September 2019, the victims55 filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “seeking
reversal of the district court’s decision denying [their] request for a remedy
for the Government’s violations of [their] CVRA rights.”56 The victims gave
multiple reasons why, contrary to the ruling of the district court, the case was
not moot, focusing in particular on the immunizing effects of the NPA on
Epstein’s co-conspirators. The victims noted that, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, the remedy for a failure to join a necessary party is not
dismissal of an action, but rather an order directing that the necessary party
be joined.57 The victims argued that the case was not moot because, if the
district court had invalidated the NPA’s immunity provision, the action
would have permitted the victims to confer with prosecutors about
prosecuting Epstein’s co-conspirators in Florida.58
Following oral argument, in April 2020 a divided (2-1) panel decision
denied the petition for a surprising reason. Rather than reach the mootness
issue presented by the victims’ petition, the panel (in an opinion written by
Judge Newsom and joined by Judge Tjoflat) overturned the district court’s

55

The petition to the Eleventh Circuit was filed by a single victim, Courtney Wild.
Because Ms. Wild also sought to assert the rights of other Epstein victims, we will refer to
the petition as having been filed by “the victims.”
56
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1, In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2019) (No.
19-13843).
57
Id. at 22–32.
58
Id. at 32–36.
The validity of the victims’ position that their case is not moot has only been reinforced
by recent events. In July 2020, Epstein’s main (alleged) co-conspirator, Ghislaine Maxwell,
was arrested and charged in the Southern District of New York with conspiring with Epstein
in sexually traffic minor girls. See Nicole Hong et al., Ghislaine Maxwell, Associate of
Jeffrey Epstein, is Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2020, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/nyregion/ghislaine-maxwell-arrest-jeffreyepstein.html. Defense attorneys for Maxwell have since made clear that they intend to argue
that the Epstein NPA blocks prosecution of Ms. Maxwell. See Thom Hals et al., Long Legal
Battle by Jeffrey Epstein Victims Could Sink Maxwell’s Defense, Reuters, July 14, 2020,
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-people-ghislaine-maxwell-plea/long-legalbattle-by-jeffrey-epstein-victims-could-sink-maxwells-defense-idUSKCN24F19A.
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previous holding from nine years earlier that CVRA rights apply before the
government files formal criminal charges against a defendant.59
The panel conceded that the facts of the case were “beyond
scandalous” and told “a tale of national disgrace,” but concluded it was
“constrained” to deny Ms. Wild’s petition.60 As the panel saw things, CVRA
rights “do not attach until criminal proceedings have been initiated against a
defendant, either by complaint, information, or indictment.”61 While the
panel recognized the plausibility of the district court’s broader interpretation
of the CVRA, the panel “reluctantly” concluded that the “best” and “most

59

In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1198.
The jurisdiction of the Circuit to have reached this issue is questionable. After the
district dismissed their case as moot, the victims sought review of that mootness
determination in the Eleventh Circuit. The Government did not file any cross-appeal raising
the issue of the CVRA’s pre-charging application, instead presenting that issue (among
others) only in its response brief. Ordinarily, without a cross-appeal, the Government could
not enlarge the issues presented on appeal. See Greenlaw v. U.S., 554 U.S. 237, 244-45
(2008). However, because the victims has used the appellate procedural vehicle specified in
the CVRA (an “application” for a writ of mandamus, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)), the panel
concluded that the Government was entitled to raise “any argument it likes” against granting
the victims’ application. 955 F.3d at 1204 n.6. But this position failed to give full effect to
the fact that, in 2015, Congress amended the CVRA’s appellate provisions, providing that
“[i]n deciding such [CVRA] application, the court of appeals shall apply ordinary standards
of appellate review.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). The clear rationale for
Congress’ amendment was the urging of crime victims’ rights advocates that “‘when victims
of crime are denied [CVRA] relief in the district court, they should receive the same sort of
appellate protections as other litigants.’” Catherine M. Goodwin, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
RESTITUTION § 12:17 (2019) (quoting Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in Federal
Appellate Courts: The Need to Broadly Construe the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’s Mandamus
Provision, 87 DENV. U.L. REV. 599, 599 (2010)). Accordingly, in its 2015 amendment,
Congress essentially codified the Second Circuit’s holding that Congress has “chosen a
petition for mandamus as a mechanism by which a crime victim may appeal a district court's
decision denying relief sought under the provisions of the CVRA.” In re W.R. Huff Asset
Management Company, 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Rather than
straightforwardly apply the amendment to simply give crime victims “ordinary standards of
appellate review,” the panel artificially and improperly gave crime victims only ordinary
substantive (but not procedural) standards of appellate review. This approach very much
deviated from “ordinary standards” of appellate review that Congress created, because it
meant that the victims must confront arguments and obstacles that other appellate litigants
do not face. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit should never have reached the issue of the
CVRA’s pre-charging application, because it was never properly presented through a
Government appeal.
60
955 F.3d at 1198.
61
Id.
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natural” reading was that the Act was not triggered until the Government
formally filed federal charges.62
Examining the CVRA’s text, the panel looked to the eight enumerated
victims’ rights in statute, noting that most of them seemed to “focus on the
post-charge phase of criminal prosecution,” such as the right to speak at
certain court hearings.63 The victim had conceded that many of the rights the
CVRA applied after the filing of criminal charges, but argued that (at least)
two rights applied during earlier phases of the process.64 One right was the
“reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the
case.”65 The panel rejected the victims’ argument that the word “case”
referred to both criminal investigations and judicial proceedings. 66 Instead,
quoting several dictionaries and two Supreme Court cases, the panel held that
“case” primarily refers to judicial proceedings, and the criminal investigation
meaning” is secondary. 67 Additionally, the panel focused on the specific
reference to the right to confer for the “attorney for the Government.”68
The victims also relied on the CVRA right “to be treated with fairness
and with respect for [his or her] dignity and privacy.”69 The panel recognized
that this right does not contain any express temporal limitation to after the
filing of charges.70 However, applying the statutory interpretation maxim,
noscitur a sociis—“words are often known by the company they keep”—the
panel determined that this right only applied post-charging because Congress
grouped with the rights with the other, earlier-listed rights that did apply postcharging.71
The panel summed up its decision by explaining it was “not a result
we like, but it’s the result we think the law requires.”72 The panel ruefully
observed that “[i]t isn’t lost on us that our decision leaves . . . [the victims]
largely emptyhanded, and we sincerely regret that. Under our reading, the
CVRA will not prevent federal prosecutors from negotiating ‘secret’ plea and
62
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non-prosecution agreements, without ever notifying or conferring with
victims, provided that they do so before instituting criminal proceedings.”73
The panel majority’s holding leaving Epstein’s victims
“emptyhanded” provoked a strenuous dissent from Judge Hull. She argued
that the majority “patently err[ed]” in giving the CVRA such a narrow
reading.74 In Judge Hull’s view, the panel’s “regrettable” interpretation of the
CVRA could be avoided simply by “enforc[ing] the plain and unambiguous
text of the CVRA.”75 Judge Hull concluded that the panel’s “contorted
statutory interpretation materially revises the statute’s plain text and guts
victims’ rights under the CVRA.”76 In Judge Hull’s view, “In addition to
ruminating in sincere regret and sympathy, we, as federal judges, should also
enforce the plain text of the CVRA—which we are bound to do—and ensure
that these crime victims have the CVRA rights that Congress has granted
them.”77
Following the Eleventh Circuit panel’s ruling, in May 2020, the
victims filed a petition for rehearing en banc. 78 The victims’ petition was
quickly supported by amicus briefs from CVRA co-sponsors Senator Dianne
Feinstein and former Senators Jon Kyl and Orrin Hatch 79 and from the
National Crime Victim Law Institute. 80
On August 7, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit, acting en banc, vacated the
panel’s earlier decision and set the case for rehearing before the full Court. 81
II. THE CVRA’S TEXT MAKES CLEAR THAT ACT APPLIES BEFORE
CRIMINAL CHARGES ARE FORMALLY FILED
73

Id. at 1221.
See id. at 1224 (Hull, J., dissenting).
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Id. (Hull, J., dissenting).
76
Id. at 1225 (Hull, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1226 (Hull, J., dissenting).
78
Petition for Rehearing En Banc, In re: Courtney Wild, No. 19-13843 (11th Cir. filed
May 5, 2020).
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Amicus brief of Senator Dianne Feinstein and former Senators Jon Kyl and Orrin
Hatch in Support of Rehearing En Banc, In re Wild, No. 19-13843 (11th Cir. filed May 12,
2020). The brief argues that “[w]hen Congress enacted the CVRA, it intended ‘to protect
crime victims. . . from the investigative phases to the final conclusion of a case.’” Id. at 3
(quoting Letter from Sen. Jon Kyl to Att'y Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr. (June 6, 2011), reprinted
in 157 CONG. REC. 8854, 8854 (2011)).
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En Banc, In re Wild, No. 19-13843 (11th Cir. filed May 12, 2020).
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Simply put, the Eleventh Circuit panel got this one wrong. The panel
decision conflicts with the CVRA’s clear text, specifically the provisions
extending rights, defining the Act’s coverage, and providing venue for
enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit en banc should recognize that the CVRA
extends crime victims’ rights before prosecutors formally file charges.
A. The CVRA’s Rights Are Not Tied to the Filing of Criminal Charges
As enacted in 2004, the CVRA enumerates eight specific rights for
crime victims.82 Some of those rights are explicitly tied to public court
proceedings—but others plainly are not. For instance, victims have the right
“not to [be] excluded for any . . . public court proceeding” and “to be
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving
release, plea, [or] sentencing . . . .”83 Obviously, because no public court
proceedings can take place without the filing of formal criminal charges,
these rights only attach after prosecutors have made a formal filing.
But other CVRA rights are clearly not linked to court proceedings.
Arguably the most expansive of these rights is a victim’s “right to be treated
with fairness and with respect for [her] dignity and privacy.” 84 A right to
“fairness” can logically and easily apply not only to judicial proceedings after
the filing of an indictment, but earlier, such as when prosecutors are
considering whether and how to file charges. If Congress wanted to limit this
overarching right to fairness to matters connected with formal charges, it
easily could have said so—but did not.
Similarly, the CVRA grants victims the “reasonable right to confer
with the attorney for the Government in the case.”85 As with the right to
fairness, the CVRA’s drafters eschewed any reference to court proceedings,
opting for the more expansive term “case.” Of course, “case” is commonly
used to refer not only to a judicial proceeding before a court, but also to an
investigation pursued by law enforcement. For example, while Black’s Law
Dictionary offers as the first definition of “case” a “civil or criminal
proceeding, action, suit or controversy at law or equity,” the second definition
is a “criminal investigation” as in “the Manson case.”86 Indeed, the Eleventh
82
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Circuit itself has frequently used the word “case” to describe criminal
investigations.87
The panel apparently determined that this usage by the CVRA’s
drafters was inapplicable, arguing that while “it’s true . . . that the term ‘case’
can mean either thing, in legal parlance the judicial-case connotation is
undoubtedly primary.”88 In so holding, as Judge Hull persuasively argued,
the panel violated “conventional rules of statutory construction.” 89 For
example, “where Congress has used a more limited term in one part of a
statute, but left it out of other parts, courts should not imply the term where
it has been excluded,”90 and “where a document has used one term in one
place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the
different term denoted a different idea.” 91 In the CVRA, Congress expressly
limited some rights to court proceedings—but not others. Therefore, under
conventional interpretive rules, the panel should have concluded that
Congress meant what it said in using the expansive term “case” rather than a
narrow formulation such as “case in the District Court.”
B. The CVRA’s Coverage Provision Makes Clear That the Act Applies
Before Charges Are Filed
The CVRA’s “coverage” provision also indicates that the Act applies
during criminal investigations. The coverage provision states that “[o]fficers
and employees of the Department of Justice and other departments and
agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or
prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims
are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in [the CVRA].”92 The
district court had relied heavily on the coverage provision, reasoning that the
See, e.g., United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting “the
FBI requested and received from the Miami Police Department the entire case files from the
Department's investigations of all four shooting incidents”); United States v. Vinales, 564 F.
App'x 518, 527–28 (11th Cir. 2014) (referring to DEA agent’s “perceptions gleaned from
his investigation of this case”), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2928 (2015);
United States v. Houltin, 566 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating law enforcement
“violated the fourth amendment by using illegal wiretaps during the investigation phase of
the case”).
88
In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 123 at 1207 (relying primarily on which definition appears
first in dictionaries).
89
See id. at 1236–37 (Hull, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 1236 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993).
91
Id. at 1236–37 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012)).
92
18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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CVRA’s inclusion of agencies handling the “detection” or “investigation” of
crimes indicates that the drafters “surely contemplate[d] pre-charge
application of the CVRA.”93
The panel, however, read the coverage provision as “a ‘to whom’
provision, not a ‘when’ provision,” because it does not “expressly speak to
when CVRA rights attach,” and “[g]overnment employees who are involved
in all three of the referenced phases are necessarily involved post charge.” 94
Judge Hull persuasively contested the panel’s reasoning, explaining that
“[l]ogically, there would be no reason to mandate that federal agencies
involved in crime ‘detection’ or ‘investigation’ see that victims are accorded
their CVRA rights if those rights did not exist pre-charge. Indeed, the use of
disjunctive wording—the ‘or’—indicates agencies that fit either description
must comply . . . .”95
The panel, while not disputing that the dissent’s interpretation was a
natural and straightforward reading of the CVRA, disagreed that the language
of the coverage provision “clearly demonstrates that the rights specified in
the Act attach during the pre-charge, investigative phase.”96 In its attempt to
explain why Congress found it necessary to break out three separate phases
of the criminal justice process, the panel was forced to retreat to the position
that Congress was somehow “attempting to broadly cover (perhaps using a
belt-and-suspenders approach) all necessary government-employee
participants . . . .”97 The panel’s concession gives away the game. Reading
the CVRA as containing “belt-and-suspenders” language renders an
important part of the statute superfluous. This interpretation thus violates a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that, “whenever possible,” statutes
should be read to give meaning to each word that Congress has selected.98 In
covering federal agencies involved in the “detection” and “investigation” of
crime, Congress clearly had in mind . . . well . . . agencies involved in
detecting and investigating crime—steps in the criminal justice process that
obviously come before the filing of criminal charges. The panel’s
interpretation improperly deprives those words of any meaningful role in the
statute.
93
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C. The CVRA’s Venue Provision Extends CVRA Rights Pre-Charging
The CVRA’s “venue” provision also plainly indicates that the Act
applies before charges are filed. The provision states: “The rights described
in [the CVRA] shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is
being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the
district court in which the crime occurred.” 99 The victims argued that the “no
prosecution is underway” language demonstrates that a victim’s CVRA rights
may be enforced before a prosecution begins, and thus “must attach before a
complaint or indictment formally charges the defendant with the crime.” 100 It
is hard to see why Congress would include this provision unless the CVRA
applies before the formal filing of charges. Indeed, the dissent concludes that
this provision “conclusively demonstrates that the Act gives crime victims
rights pre-charge . . . .”101 Read most naturally, the dissent explains that “this
venue provision provides that, if a prosecution is underway, victims may
assert their rights in the ongoing criminal action. If, however, ‘no prosecution
is underway,’ victims may assert their rights in the district court in which the
crime occurred.”102
The panel grudgingly conceded that the victims’ interpretation was
“not implausible.”103 But the panel refused to adopt it, holding that there are
“at least two alternative ways of understanding” the venue provision.104 First,
the panel argued that because a “prosecution” is not commenced by the filing
of a formal complaint, but rather begins upon “a suspect’s ‘initial appearance
before a judicial officer,’” the “venue” provision “could be read to apply to
the period of time between the initiation of criminal proceedings . . . and the
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levying of formal charges in an indictment.” 105 Second, the panel contended
that “no prosecution is underway” could also “refer to the period after a
‘prosecution’ has run its course . . . .”106
The panel’s first reading is strained. The panel believes that the phrase
“no prosecution is underway” could hypertechnically refer only to the mere
hours “between the filing of the criminal complaint and the suspect’s initial
appearance before a judge . . . .”107 The panel’s reading is anything but the
“most obvious” interpretation, since victims’ interests are not often
implicated during these hours.108 In fact, no other court has ever given the
venue provision such a narrow construction. Perhaps this is because, in many
federal criminal cases, no complaint is ever filed; many federal criminal cases
proceed by way of formal indictment.
The panel’s reading of the “no prosecution underway” language
hinges on the counterintuitive idea that even the formal filing of a federal
criminal complaint does not trigger a “prosecution”—and thus the CVRA’s
no-prosecution-underway language refers to at least a few hours during the
criminal justice process. However, several sources commonly use the term
“prosecution” to refer to events that happen after the filing of a complaint.
The nation’s leading criminal procedure hornbook states that “[w]ith the
filing of the complaint, the arrestee officially becomes a ‘defendant’ in a
criminal prosecution.”109 Additionally, multiple Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure use the term “prosecution” in this way. 110 For example, under Rule
20(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “a prosecution” may be
transferred from the judicial district “from which a warrant on a complaint
has been issued.”111 Under Rule 20(c), if the transfer on a complaint
ultimately leads to a not guilty plea, then the “clerk must return the papers to
the court where the prosecution began . . . .”112 As these sources illustrate, the
common-sense meaning of the term “prosecution” is that, when the
Government has filed a sworn compliant—i.e., a “written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged,” 113—a “prosecution” has
105
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begun. Before then, no prosecution is “underway,” and under the CVRA’s
venue provision, victims assert their CVRA rights in the district where the
crime was committed.
Rather than adopting this uncomplicated reading of the statute, the
panel resorted to a different body of law, citing various cases regarding when
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.114 These constitutional
rulings hold that, in the context of the Sixth Amendment, no right to counsel
attaches until the defendant physically appears in Court—and thus no
“prosecution” begins until that time. 115 However, the panel’s cited caselaw is
inapposite on this issue. First, Congress enacted the CVRA in 2004. The
panel’s caselaw is all post-CVRA enactment and directly conflicts with
substantial pre-enactment Court of Appeals authority, which holds that the
filing of a complaint is sufficient to trigger the Sixth Amendment’s right to
counsel.116 Second, as the dissent pointed out, it is unclear why the panel
believed that the time frame for the attachment of the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment is dispositive for determining when a “prosecution”
typically begins.117 In fact, if the panel had looked to the caselaw for the
attachment of the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, then it
would have found that a “prosecution” begins “as early as the time of arrest
and holding to answer a criminal charge.”118
Moreover, the panel’s interpretation of when no “prosecution is
underway” gives a decidedly technical interpretation of the CVRA,
counterintuitively construing it as employing “legal term[s] of art.”119 A
reading that employs the common meaning of the CVRA’s language makes
more sense, as most crime victims (unlike criminal defendants) will lack legal
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See id. at 1212 (citing United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 199–200 (4th Cir.
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(2008)).
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n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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counsel to help them navigate the criminal justice process.120 Thus, when
unrepresented crime victims are reading the venue provision in the CVRA to
determine where to assert their rights, they should not be expected to have
mastered a subtext of Sixth Amendment right-attachment jurisprudence upon
which the panel’s strained reading necessarily relies.
After the panel gave its first interpretation of the venue provision as
applying during the hours after the filing of a criminal complaint, without any
sense of apparent irony the panel offered an alternative interpretation—that
clause might also be read to somehow refer not to the very beginning of the
process, but to its very end. The panel’s puzzling interpretation of the clause
reasoned that the no-prosecution-underway language might refer to the time
“period after a ‘prosecution’ has run its course and resulted in a final
judgment of conviction.”121 The dissent correctly pointed out that the panel’s
alternative interpretation “does not comport with how the word ‘underway’
is ordinarily or commonly understood.”122 Indeed, “it is a stretch to say that
when something is not ‘underway,’ it is commonly or ordinarily understood
to mean that the something is completed.”123
This alternative reading is also curious because, if a final judgment
exists, then it is hard to understand how any victims’ rights could still be at
stake. But in an attempt to defend its reading, the panel noted that the CVRA
permits a victim to “re-open a plea or sentence.”124 Then, recognizing a
problem, the panel immediately dropped a footnote, conceding that this
reading “isn’t perfectly seamless, in that it would require the victim to file
her post-judgment motion ‘in the district in which the crime occurred’ rather
than, as one might expect, in the district in which the prosecution occurred
and the conviction was entered.” 125 Not “perfectly seamless” indeed! For
example, under the panel’s reading, the CVRA could require a victim to file
a post-judgment motion to re-open a defendant’s criminal sentence in a court
that lacks any jurisdiction to do so. It is unclear why the panel prefers this
fallback reading of the no-prosecution-underway clause over the dissent’s
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“seamless” reading, especially after recognizing the plausibility of the
dissent’s interpretation.
In sum, the panel’s interpretation of the CVRA does not give the
statutory language its most straightforward reading. Perhaps recognizing the
problems with its textual approach, the panel also relied on policy
arguments against giving the statute its most natural interpretation. We turn
to these policy arguments in the next Part.
III. READING THE CVRA AS EXTENDING SOME PRE-CHARGING RIGHTS
DOES NOT UNDULY BURDEN LAW ENFORCEMENT
In an attempt to support its strained reading of the CVRA, the panel
argued that adopting the victims’ interpretation would burden law
enforcement. In the panel’s view, if the CVRA applies before charges are
filed, then there would be no logical stopping point”—and the Government
would be required to consult with victims “before raids, warrant applications,
arrests, witness interviews, lineups, and interrogations.”126 This Part responds
to the panel’s far-fetched “slippery slope” argument. In fact, as experience
demonstrates, applying CVRA rights pre-charge will not interfere with
criminal investigations.
A. CVRA Rights Can Apply Before Charging Without Interfering with the
Proper Functioning of the Criminal Justice System
The panel reasoned that reading the CVRA as applying before charges
are filed would “open[] the floodgates” to the possibility of prosecutors being
required to confer with victims “before law-enforcement officers conduct a
raid, seek a warrant, or conduct an investigation.” 127 While the victims had
suggested that the CVRA rights would only attach once the investigation had
matured to a certain point, the panel rejected such a logical approach by
reasoning that it “has no basis in the CVRA’s text.”128 As the panel saw
things, if CVRA rights were to “apply during the ‘detection’ and
‘investigation’ of [a] crime, then there is no meaningful basis—at least no
meaningful textual basis—for limiting the Act’s pre-charge application to the
NPA context.”129 Concluding that the victims’ reading extending rights
before charging “provides no logical stopping point,” the panel held that “the
126
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CVRA’s text is best read as applying only after the commencement of
criminal proceedings, whether by complaint, information, or indictment.” 130
The panel’s argument about untoward consequences is unconvincing.
The CVRA’s right to confer is, in fact, limited to the “reasonable right to
confer.”131 The panel recognized that reasonableness limitation, but held that
it was a “squishy” limitation that could be overlooked to “require lawenforcement officers to ‘confer’ with victims . . . before conducting a raid,
seeking a warrant, making an arrest, interviewing a witness, convening a
lineup, or conducting an interrogation.”132 The panel refused to “assume that
Congress intended such a jarring result.”133
It is unclear why the panel did not simply hold that a “jarring result”
would be an “unreasonable” result—i.e., something that the CVRA did not
require. Judge Hull’s dissent quite properly focused on this contradiction. She
explained that “a victim's ‘reasonable right to confer’ is a forceful limiting
principle and embodies a common, workable legal standard that is sufficient
to stave off the majority’s speculations about ‘enterprising’ crime victims and
‘innovative’ judges” applying the CVRA to inappropriate circumstances. 134
Presumably, the reasonableness limitation to the CVRA’s right to confer
explains why the panel’s conjectured problems have never occurred
anywhere in the country, even though (as discussed below) the CVRA has
been applied pre-charging by other courts—such as the Fifth Circuit.135
The panel opinion’s recurring concern was that applying the CVRA
pre-charging, while “not implausible” as a matter of text, 136 somehow
produced a result that the panel disagreed with—i.e., a requirement that law
enforcement officials will too often be forced to “reasonably” confer with
crime victims before charges are filed. As an empirical matter, the panel’s
concerns are overblown (as we discuss in the next Section). But as a
jurisprudential matter, the panel opinion is curious. The Eleventh Circuit has
repeatedly endorsed a textual approach to statutory construction, holding that
when the statutory “language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning,”
130
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the court “need go no further.” 137 Judge Hull put the point incisively,
observing that “[g]iven this is a plain-text case, the [m]ajority curiously
carries on at length about slippery slopes and bad policy implications . . . .”138
Ultimately, it is for Congress to decide what kinds of rights crime
victims deserve at various points in the federal criminal justice process. It is
hard to comprehend how the panel concluded that Congress did not intend to
cover cases such as the Epstein case, especially given that the panel
“regret[ed]” its ruling139 and that it seemed “obvious” that prosecutors should
have conferred with Epstein’s victims.140 Instead of adopting a less
“regrettable” reading of the CVRA, the panel essentially determined that
Congress drafted the Act—essentially a broad bill of rights for crime
victims—in a way that could be easily circumvented by prosecutors through
“negotiating ‘secret’ plea and non-prosecution agreements . . . before
instituting criminal proceedings.”141 Surely a more desirable reading of the
Act is one that blocks such deceitful maneuvers.
The panel did not doubt that avoiding “secret” plea deals was
desirable, but eschewed such a reading based on its prediction that it would
produce intractable administrative problems in other areas.142 However, the
panel’s sky-will-fall prediction is belied by the Justice Department’s
demonstrated ability to provide pre-charging rights to victims—including
during the Epstein case that was before the Court! For example, the Justice
Department had no difficulty determining that, as of 2006, when its “attorney
for the Government in the case”143 was actively negotiating with Epstein’s
defense team, the case had matured to the point where Epstein’s victims
possessed CVRA rights. Indeed, the Government’s lead prosecutor mailed
more than thirty Epstein victims “standard CVRA victim notification
letters”144 telling Ms. Wild and other victims that, “as a victim . . . of a federal
offense you have a number of [CVRA] rights.” 145 Thereafter, the Government
sent notices about the progress of the case to Epstein’s victims (although the
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candor of those notices was dubious).146 Thus, the Government itself initially
took the position that the victims had “statutory rights to ‘confer with the
attorney for the Government in the case,’ ‘to be treated with fairness,’ and to
petition the district court if [their] CVRA rights were being violated” 147—
which belies the idea that extending rights before charges would be
impractical. Indeed, as Judge Hull explained, “this initial position of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office . . . is not surprising,” because “[t]he [CVRA] was enacted
to make crime victims full participants in the criminal justice system.”148
Additionally, in 2011, the District Court gave the same reading to the
CVRA that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had previously—that is, that the
CVRA applied before charges were filed 149—and the sky did not fall in the
Southern District of Florida for the more than eight years when this ruling
was in effect. Surely if the panel’s concerns were real, it would have been
possible to find a concrete example to illustrate the point during the many
hundreds of federal criminal prosecutions that moved forward in that court.
In its briefing before the Eleventh Circuit, the Justice Department did
not argue—much less provide evidence—that it would be unduly burdened
by affording pre-charging rights to victims of federal crimes. Its silence on
this point is likely because federal agencies have long been required to
provide victims rights before charging. Long before it enacted the CVRA in
2004, Congress enacted the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990
(“VRRA”). In that statute, Congress mandated that all federal agencies
engaged in “the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime” must
“[i]dentify the victim or victims of a crime” at “the earliest opportunity after
the detection of a crime at which it may be done without interfering with an
investigation . . . .”150 The VRRA further requires federal agencies to provide
the identified victims with “the earliest possible notice of . . . the status of the
investigation of the crime, to the extent it is appropriate to inform the victim
and to the extent that it will not interfere with the investigation.” 151 In light
of these provisions, the Justice Department’s investigative agencies have long
“provide[d] [service referrals, reasonable protection, and notice concerning
the status of the investigation] to thousands of victims every year, whether or
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not the investigation results in a federal prosecution.” 152 Thus, when
Congress was crafting the CVRA in 2004, it presumably understood that the
Justice Department was already providing pre-charging notifications to crime
victims because of the VRRA’s requirements.
Additionally, in 2015, Congress added a new right to the CVRA that
indisputably applies pre-charging—specifically, “the right to be informed of
. . . the services described in [the VRRA] . . . .”153 This 2015 amendment
confirms that Congress understood the CVRA as applying pre-charging,
because the amendment requires notice to victims about VRRA “services”
provided well before charges are filed. 154 For example, the VRRA states that
rape victims should be provided with notice of medical services available to
them.155 But victims seeking to enforce their (2015) CVRA right to notice
about VRRA services must rely on the CVRA’s pre-existing (2004)
enforcement mechanisms—including the venue provision discussed in Part
II of this Article.156 The fact that, in 2015, Congress added a right that
undeniably applies before charges are formally filed—and simply relied on
the existing (2004) venue provision—confirms that Congress thought that it
already enacted a statute that applied before formal charging. Put another
way, given that Congress thought it could “plug-and-play” a new CVRA
provision providing notice about certain pre-charging services into the thenexisting CVRA enforcement mechanisms, those mechanisms must have
already applied pre-charging. And the broader point remains: The Justice
Department has been able to provide victims rights before the filing of
criminal charges without any demonstrated administrative problems.
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Long-Standing Application of the CVRA Before
Charging Refutes the Eleventh Circuit Panel’s Policy Concerns About PreCharging Rights
If the panel were correct that applying the CVRA pre-charging
application would produce a parade of horribles, then those horribles should
have already materialized in the Fifth Circuit.157 That Circuit, large and
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populous and adjacent to the Eleventh Circuit, has long applied the CVRA
before formal charges are filed—without any reported problems.
In 2008, the Fifth Circuit decided In re Dean. 158 That case arose out
of a federal criminal investigation for an explosion at a refinery operated by
BP Products North America (BP), which killed fifteen and injured more than
170.159 Suspecting that the explosion may have been due to BP’s corporate
malfeasance, the Justice Department investigated possible federal criminal
violations. As the case progressed, the federal prosecutors entered into plea
negotiations with BP. But (as in the Epstein case), the defense attorneys for
BP pushed the government to keep its negotiations secret. So, the federal
prosecutors asked for a court order relieving the government of any
obligation to consult with the victims until after the plea was final. The
district court believed that “any public notification of a potential criminal
disposition resulting from the government's investigation [of the] explosion
would prejudice [BP] and could impair the plea negotiation process and may
prejudice the case in the event that no plea is reached.”160
After a plea deal was signed and agreed to between the federal
prosecutors and BP, it was unsealed, and victims of the explosion sought to
have the agreement set aside. Unsuccessful in the district court, 161 the victims
sought to have the agreement set aside by the Fifth Circuit. Relying on the
CVRA, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s decision to keep a plea
deal secret from victims until after it was filed. The Fifth Circuit explained
that “[i]n passing the [CVRA], Congress made the policy decision—which
we are bound to enforce—that the victims have a right to inform the plea
negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement
is reached.”162 The Circuit remanded the case base to the district court for
further proceeding to give the victims an opportunity to object to the
arrangement.163
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The Dean holding created a real problem for the Eleventh Circuit
panel majority. As a result of that 2008 decision, the controlling law in the
Fifth Circuit has extended CVRA rights to victims before charges were filed
for more than a decade. Given that the Circuit has handled well over one
hundred thousand criminal cases during that time, 164 why have no reports
emerged of the kinds of problems that the panel prophesized in the Epstein
case?
The panel attempted to bury the inconvenient fact that the Fifth
Circuit has long been doing what the panel argued was essentially impossible.
The panel majority relegated its discussion of Dean to a footnote and then
gave several (unpersuasive) reasons for splitting from the Dean holding.165
For example, the panel characterized the Fifth Circuit ruling as “technically
dictum” because the Fifth Circuit ultimately denied the mandamus petition
asking for the plea to be set aside and simply remanded to the district court.166
But to achieve that result, the Fifth Circuit had initially granted the victims’
petition, blocking any further district court consideration of the BP plea
agreement until the Fifth Circuit could finally rule.167 And then, when the
Circuit finally released its published opinion, it stated in the opinion’s
opening paragraph that “[w]e find a statutory violation [of the
CVRA] . . . .”168 The penultimate sentence in the Fifth Circuit's decision also
instructed that, on remand, “the district court will take heed that the victims
have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA . . . .”169 The
Eleventh Circuit panel’s footnote appears to be the first time, in the more than
a decade since the Fifth Circuit handed down its decision, that any court (or
legal scholar) has called the Fifth Circuit decision dictum. 170
The panel also gave as a reason for declining to follow Dean that the
parties there “didn’t even dispute whether the CVRA applies before the
commencement of criminal proceedings,” and accordingly, “the question that
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this case so clearly tees up was never subject to adversarial testing.” 171 But in
raising this narrow jurisprudential point, the panel missed the larger point:
That the CVRA covered pre-charging plea negotiations was so obvious to the
“parties” in that case—including the Justice Department—that no one even
thought to contest it. Presumably the reason that Justice Department lawyers
were not challenging the issue was that they have long been applying the
CVRA before charging, without any problems in the Fifth Circuit.
If the Eleventh Circuit panel decision is reinstated en banc, the circuit
split with the Fifth Circuit will create undesirable “forum shopping”
consequences. For example, whether prosecutors must confer about nonprosecution agreements is a recurring issue, particularly in complicated and
important criminal investigations. In fact, in the context of resolving the
investigation of corporate crimes, deferred and non-prosecution agreements
have been described as the “standard method.” 172 Thus, under the Eleventh
Circuit panel’s ruling, in the future, multistate businesses will no doubt try
and negotiate secret non-prosecution agreements in the Eleventh Circuit that
would be impossible in other circuits. In other words, before charges are filed,
the Eleventh Circuit will become a safe haven for circumventing the CVRA.
IV. MOVING BEYOND THE EPSTEIN LITIGATION TO PROTECT CRIME
VICTIMS DURING INVESTIGATIONS
A. Addressing Secret Non-Prosecution Agreements
For all the reasons just discussed, the Eleventh Circuit’s divided panel
decision allowing secret non-prosecution agreements contradicts both the
CVRA’s plain language and important public policy considerations. Now that
the case has been set for rehearing en banc, the full Eleventh Circuit should
reject the earlier approach of the panel decision and instead issue a fullthroated endorsement of the CVRA pre-charging coverage—for all the
reasons articulated in this Article.
But regardless of how this particular case ultimately plays out before
the Circuit (or the Supreme Court173), the CVRA’s protections for crime
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victims need to be clearly established. Even the panel decision appeared to
recognize that further congressional action would be useful on this issue. In
calling its own decision “regrettable,” the panel noted that it was simply
interpreting the CVRA in light of how “matters currently stand—which is to
say at least as the CVRA is currently written.”174 The panel concluded that it
was constrained to leave the victims “emptyhanded,” and it was up to
Congress to “amend the Act to make its intent clear.”175 In fact, the panel
noted that its decision would allow prosecutors to enter “secret” pleas and
NPAs “without ever notifying or conferring with victims . . . .”176 The panel
was unhappy with this conclusion, admitting that in “the wake of the public
outcry over the federal prosecutors’ handling of the Epstein case,” “we can
only hope” that prosecutors will not strike secret plea deals in the future.177
The dissent, while vehemently disagreeing with whether further
congressional action was required to give victims pre-charging rights,
powerfully explained that the panel’s decision rendered the CVRA
“impotent” in important situations and had the effect of “revis[ing] the
statute’s plain text” and “gut[ting] victims’ rights under the CVRA.”178 The
dissent, too, seemed to invite congressional action. The dissent put the point
plainly, concluding that “[o]ur criminal justice system should safeguard
children from sexual exploitation by criminal predators, not re-victimize
them.”179 Presumably, the dissent was recognizing that child sex trafficking
victims in other cases might not be able to secure pro bono attorneys to pursue
more than twelve years of litigation to litigate and protect their rights—which
is what the attorneys for Courtney Wild and other Epstein victims have had
to undertake.
One way of addressing the need to protect victims before charges are
filed is set out in proposed legislation currently pending before Congress. In
2019, Representative Jackie Speier and a bi-partisan group of representatives
introduced a bill that would ensure that no other courts would reach the
strained conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit panel majority. The legislation is
entitled the “Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019”
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(CVRRA),180 recognizing the role that Courtney Wild—the lead victim in the
Eleventh Circuit’s In re Wild case—has played in trying to hold Jeffrey
Epstein accountable.181 As Representative Speier explained, her bill
is named for the survivor who courageously led the way in
asserting the rights of the scores of victims who fell prey to
Jeffrey Epstein in Florida and were kept in the dark as federal
prosecutors hashed out a secret and shockingly lenient plea deal.
Courtney Wild fought in court for over 10 years before a Federal
District Court finally declared that her rights, and the rights of
other victims of the serial sexual predator, under the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act were violated.182
The CVRRA contains several important provisions that would help
ensure that crime victims like Ms. Wild never again have to face arguments
like those encountered from federal prosecutors in the Epstein case. Of
particular importance for this Article, the legislation would add language that
would specifically supersede the Eleventh Circuit panel’s perverse ruling.
While the panel held that victims had the right to confer with prosecutors only
after charges had been filed, the CVRRA would make clear—through
clarifying legislation183—that crime victims have the reasonable right to
180
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confer about not only “the case,” but also “any plea bargain or other
resolution of the case before such plea bargain or resolution is presented to
the court or otherwise finalized.”184 Thus, if approved, the CVRRA would
give victims pre-charging rights when criminal case resolutions are being
negotiated, “[c]larify[ing] that victims of federal crimes have the right to
confer with the Government and be informed about key pre-charging
developments in a case, such as plea bargains, non-prosecution agreements,
and referrals to state and local law enforcement.”185
The CVRRA also expands language in the 2015 amendment to the
CVRA, providing that victims must receive timely notice not only of a “plea
bargain or deferred prosecution agreement,” but also of any “nonprosecution
agreement, or the referral of a criminal investigation to another Federal, State,
or local law enforcement entity.”186 This language would also prevent
prosecutors from ever again reaching the kind of secret non-prosecution
agreement that they reached in the Epstein case. 187
The CVRRA also contains a provision that would simplify litigation
regarding crime victims’ rights compliance regarding non-prosecution
agreements (as well as other issues). The CVRRA provides that if a dispute
arises about CVRA compliance, then the Justice Department “shall promptly
provide[] to the victim and, if requested, to the court reviewing the issue all
relevant information and documents concerning the circumstances . . . .”188
This provision would respond to the remarkable fact that between filing their
action to enforce the CVRA and their motion for summary judgment,
Epstein’s victims spent more than seven years(!) in litigation that produced
hundreds of docket entries.189 Those years were spent attempting to pry from
the government information about what had happened leading up to the secret
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NPA with Epstein.190 Just as prosecutors have long been required to provide
all exculpatory information to criminal defendants,191 the prosecutors should
likewise be required to rapidly provide to victims information about the
circumstances surrounding a possible violation of crime victims’ rights.
B. Extending Rights During the Investigative Process
The changes just discussed would effectively address one of the key
problems in the Epstein case: secret non-prosecution agreements. But
addressing such secret case resolutions is a manifestation of a larger problem,
namely, how to ensure that crime victims are treated fairly during criminal
investigations. In an earlier Article six years ago, two of us (Cassell and
Edwards) suggested that the CVRA rights could be properly interpreted as
extending victim rights before charges are filed when a federal criminal case
has crystalized to a point where identifiable victims exist. We formulated our
proposed interpretation this way:
CVRA rights attach when an officer or employee of the
Department of Justice or any other department or agency of
the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or
prosecution of crime has substantial evidence that an
identifiable person has been directly and proximately harmed
as a result of the commission of a federal offense . . . and in
the judgment of the officer or employee, that person is a
putative victim of that offense.192
In defense of this interpretation, we suggested that this formulation would
borrow from the CVRA’s “coverage” provision 193 and would provide a
workable approach to determining when a case had progressed to the point
where crime victims’ rights could reasonably attach.
The panel decision specifically discussed this interpretation in its
decision, explaining that “Professor Cassell’s proposal reads like a finelytuned statutory provision—but one that, unfortunately, Congress never
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enacted.”194 For reasons discussed throughout this Article, we disagree that
the CVRA does not currently extend pre-charging rights to victims. But, of
course, Congress could respond to the Eleventh Circuit’s narrow—and selfdescribed “unfortunate”—reading of the CVRA by adopting a “finely-tuned
statutory provision” along these lines.
As explained earlier in this Article,195 adding such language into the
CVRA would not create any noticeable problems for federal law enforcement
agencies. Indeed, under the VRRA, federal law enforcement agencies have
been obligated ever since 1990 to provide identified victims with “the earliest
possible notice of . . . the status of the investigation of the crime, to the extent
it is appropriate to inform the victim and to the extent that it will not interfere
with the investigation.”196 Federal law enforcement agencies are thus already
well versed in responding to the concerns of crime victims during criminal
investigations.
The effect of extending CVRA rights into the investigative process is
limited but important. The most far-reaching substantive right that victims
would gain during the investigation would be the “right to be treated with
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.”197 But while
that right is far-reaching, affording victims this right should not require any
changes to existing law enforcement practices. Hopefully, federal agencies
are already treating victims fairly and respectfully and providing a right to
such treatment would simply reinforce and guarantee what should be an
existing practice.
Since 2015, victims have also had a right under the CVRA “to be
informed of the rights under this Section and the services described in [the
VRRA] . . . .”198 This provision provides pre-charging notice to crime victims
about such services as the medical treatment available to rape victims. Clearly
this previously established right has been—and can continue to be—afforded
to victims before charges are filed. Indeed, the Justice Department is already
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providing such notices “to thousands of victims every year, whether or not
the investigation results in a federal prosecution.” 199
And finally, extending rights before charging would give victims the
“right to be reasonably protected from the accused.”200 This right can be
particularly important for victims of violent crimes, who may face retaliation
by those who have victimized them because they are cooperating with law
enforcement. Extending a right of protection for such victims can be literally
a life-or-death matter.201 Waiting for the filing of charges before giving crime
victims reasonable protection is waiting too long.
Reading the CVRA as generally extending rights before charging
would not be an innovation, but rather a restoration of the original vision of
the CVRA’s drafters. Senator Kyl wrote a law review article about the Act in
2005, the year after he successfully co-sponsored enactment of the law. In his
article, Senator Kyl explained that the CVRA applies before charges are filed:
While most of the rights guaranteed by the CVRA apply in the
context of legal proceedings following arrest and charging,
other important rights are triggered by the harm inflicted by
the crime itself. For example, the right to be treated with
fairness, the right to be reasonably protected from the accused
(who may qualify as the accused before his arrest), and the
right to be treated with respect for the victim's dignity and
privacy each may arise without regard to the existence of legal
proceedings.202
In 2005, Senator Kyl clearly believed that the CVRA extended these rights
to crime victims even before charges are filed. That vision was sound then
and, in the wake of an appellate panel’s departure from it, should now be
codified even more directly into the CVRA.
CONCLUSION
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The highly publicized Jeffrey Epstein case highlights a perennial
issue in more routine the criminal justice cases. Victims have critical
concerns at stake even before prosecutors formally file criminal charges—
rights that Congress appeared to have protected for victims of federal crimes
in enacting the CVRA. But, unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit panel ruling,
if reinstated by the Eleventh Circuit en banc, would mean that, at least for
victims within that Circuit, the CVRA would provide no protection for
victims during criminal investigations. And prosecutors would remain free,
for example, to circumvent the CVRA and negotiate secret non-prosecution
agreements.
Hopefully, the earlier panel was an aberration, which will be swiftly
corrected by the Eleventh Circuit acting en banc (or by the Supreme Court, if
the Eleventh Circuit en banc splits from Fifth Circuit’s position that the
CVRA applies pre charging). But Congress can also amend the CVRA to
prevent future litigation (such as occurred in the Epstein case for more than
twelve years) and guarantee protection for crime victims. Congress should
clarify the Act by directly adding language that victims have a right to confer
about non-prosecution agreements and other dispositions of federal criminal
cases. And Congress should also clarify that during criminal investigations,
crime victims possess other general CVRA rights, such as the right to fair
treatment.
Of course, the issues surrounding the fair treatment of crime victims
are not confined to federal criminal cases. As crime victims’ rights become a
recognized part of America’s criminal justice architecture, those rights should
also extend into the investigative and charging processes. The filing of
criminal charges is an important part of the criminal justice system. But it is
illogical to deprive crime victims of any rights until prosecutors finally make
their charging decision. As the Epstein case sadly illustrates, such an artificial
boundary can be misused by prosecutors to dispose of criminal cases while
keeping victims in the dark about what is happening.
Crime victims suffer immediately—and often irreparably—when
criminals commit crimes. Victims deserve rights in the criminal justice
process while prosecutors determine whether to hold those criminals
accountable.
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